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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency- 
selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As 
opposed to the existing iterative water-filling algorithm that studies the myopic users, this paper studies how a 
foresighted user, who knows the channel state information and response strategies of its competing users, should 
optimize its transmission strategy. To characterize this multi-user interaction, the Stackelberg equilibrium is 
introduced, and the existence of this equilibrium for the investigated non-cooperative game is shown. We 
analyze this interaction in more detail using a simple two-user example, where the foresighted user determines 
its transmission strategy by solving as a bi-level program which allows him to account for the myopic user’s 
response. It is analytically shown that a foresighted user can improve its performance, if it has the necessary 
information about its competitors. Since the optimal solution of Stackelberg equilibrium is computationally 
prohibitive, we propose a practical low-complexity approach based on Lagrangian duality theory. Numerical 
simulations verify the performance improvements. Possible ways to acquire the required information and to 
extend the formulation to more than two users are also discussed. 
Index Terms— interference channel, power control, non-cooperative game, Stackelberg equilibrium 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The multi-user power control problem in frequency-selective interference channels was investigated from the 
game-theoretic perspective in several prior works, including [1]-[6]. In these multi-user wideband power control 
games, users are modeled as players having individual goals and strategies. They are competing or cooperating 
with each other until they agree on an acceptable resource allocation outcome. Existing research can be 
categorized into two types, non-cooperative games and cooperative games. 
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First, the formulation of the multi-user wideband power control problem as a non-cooperative game has 
appeared in several recent works [1][2]. An iterative water-filling (IW) algorithm was proposed to mitigate the 
mutual interference and optimize the performance without the need for a central controller [1]. At every decision 
stage, selfish users deploying this algorithm try to maximize their achievable rates by water-filling across the 
whole frequency band until a Nash equilibrium is reached. Alternatively, self-enforcing protocols are studied in 
the non-cooperative scenario, in which incentive compatible allocations are guaranteed [2]. By imposing 
punishments in the case of misbehavior and enforcing users to cooperate, efficient, fair, and incentive 
compatible spectrum sharing is shown to be possible.  
Second, there also have been a number of related works studying dynamic spectrum management (DSM) in 
the setting of cooperative games [3]-[6]. Two (near-) optimal but centralized DSM algorithms, the Optimal 
Spectrum Balancing (OSB) algorithm and the Iterative Spectrum Balancing (ISB) algorithm, were proposed to 
solve the problem of maximization of a weighted rate-sum across all users [4][5]. OSB has an exponential 
complexity in the number of users. ISB only has a quadratic complexity in the number of users because it 
implements the optimization in an iterative fashion. An autonomous spectrum balancing (ASB) technique is 
proposed to achieve near-optimal performance autonomously, without real-time explicit information exchanges 
[6]. These works focus on cooperative games, because it is well-known that the IW algorithm may lead to 
Pareto-inefficient solutions [7], i.e. selfishness is detrimental in the interference channel.  
In short, previous research mainly concentrates on studying the existence and performance of Nash 
equilibrium in non-cooperative games and developing efficient algorithms to approach the Pareto boundary in 
cooperative games. However, an important intrinsic dimension of this decentralized multi-user interaction still 
remains unexplored. Prior research does not consider the users’ availability of information about other users and 
their potential to improve their performance when having this information. Hence, determining what is the best 
response strategy of a selfish user if it has the information about how the competing users respond to 
interference still needs to be determined. Moreover, it still needs to be established if such strategies can lead to a 
better performance than adopting the IW algorithm. It is important to look at these scenarios in order to assess 
the significance of information availability in terms of its impact on the users’ performance in non-cooperative 
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games, and show why selfish users have incentives to learn their environment and adapt their rational response 
strategies [8]. Intuitively, a “clever” user with more information in this non-cooperative game should be able to 
gain additional benefits [9].  
Throughout this paper, we differentiate two types of selfish users based on their response strategies:  
1) Myopic user: A user that always acts to maximize its immediate achievable rate. It is myopic in the sense 
that it treats other users’ actions as fixed, ignores the dependence between its competitors’ actions and its own 
action, and determines its response such that maximize its immediate payoff. 
2) Foresighted user: A user that selects its transmission action by considering the long-term impacts on its 
performance. It anticipates how the others will react, and maximizes its performance by considering their 
reactions. It should be highlighted that additional information is required to assist the foresighted user in its 
decision making. 
As opposed to previous approaches considering myopic users [1], we discuss in this paper how foresighted 
users should behave in non-cooperative power control games. We explicitly show that a strategic user can gain 
more benefit if it takes its competitors’ information and response strategies into account. The concept of 
Stackelberg equilibrium is adopted in order to characterize the optimal power control strategy of a foresighted 
user by considering the response of its competing users. For the two-user case, we formulate the foresighted 
user’s decision making to be a bi-level programming problem, show that the optimal solution is computa- 
tionally prohibitive, and provide a low-complexity algorithm based on Lagrangian duality theory.  
We also note that there are already some papers applying Stackelberg equilibrium to allocate the resources in 
networking [10]. However, the problems and the proposed solutions in these papers are completely different 
from this paper. The focus here is to study the strategic behavior of selfish users, which has not been yet 
investigated in multi-user interference channels. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the non-cooperative game model and 
introduces the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium. In Section III, using a simple two-user example, we 
formulate the foresighted user’s optimal decision making as a bi-level programming problem and discuss the 
computational complexity of its optimal solution. Section IV proposes a low-complexity dual-based approach 
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and provides the simulation results. Section IV also discusses how the required information can be obtained by 
the strategic users and the problem formulation in general multi-user case. Conclusions are drawn in Section V. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we describe the mathematical model of the frequency-selective interference channel and 
formulate the non-cooperative multi-user power control game. We introduce the concept of Stackelberg 
equilibrium and prove the existence of this equilibrium in the power control game. 
A. System Description 
Fig. 1 illustrates a frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel model. There are K  transmitters and K  
receivers in the system. Each transmitter and receiver pair can be viewed as a player (or user). The whole 
frequency band is divided into N  frequency bins. In frequency bin f , the channel gain from transmitter i  to 
receiver j  is denoted as fijH , where 1,2, ,f N= " . Similarly, denote the noise power spectral density (PSD) 
that receiver k  experiences as fkσ  and player k ’s transmit PSD as fkP . For user k , the transmit PSD is subject 
to its power constraint: 
1
N f
kf
P= ≤∑ maxkP .                                                                    (1) 
Define { }1 2, , , Nk k k kP P P= "P  as user k ’s power allocation pattern. For a fixed kP , if treating interference as 
noise, user k  can achieve the following data rate: 
2
2 2
1
log 1
f fN
k kk
k f f ff jk jkj k
P H
R
P Hσ= ≠
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ .                                                   (2) 
To fully capture the performance tradeoff in the system, the concept of a rate region is defined as 
( ) ( ){ }1 1, , : , , (1) (2)K KR R satisfying and= ∃" "P PR .                                (3) 
Due to the non-convexity in the capacity expression as a function of power allocations, the computational 
complexity of optimal solutions (e.g., doing exhaustive search) in finding the rate region is prohibitively high. 
Existing works [4]-[6] aim to compute the Pareto boundary of this rate region and provide (near-) optimal 
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performance with moderate complexity. Moreover, it is noted that cooperation among users is indispensable for 
this multi-user system to operate at the Pareto boundary. On the other hand, the interference channel can also be 
modeled as a non-cooperative game among multiple competing users. Instead of solving the optimization 
problem globally, the IW algorithm models the users as myopic decision makers [1]. This means that they 
optimize their transmit PSD by water-filling and compete to increase their transmission data rates with the sole 
objective of maximizing their own performance regardless of the coupling among users. Under a wide range of 
realistic channel conditions [1][13], the existence and uniqueness of the competitive optimal point (Nash 
equilibrium) is demonstrated and it can be obtained by the IW algorithm, which significantly outperforms the 
static spectrum management algorithms. 
Throughout this paper, we also concentrate on the non-cooperative game setting. In the IW algorithm, users 
are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they update actions shortsightedly without considering the long-term impacts of 
taking these actions. We argue that the myopic behavior can be further improved because it neglects the 
coupling nature of players’ actions and payoffs. In contrast with previous approaches, we study the problem of 
how a foresighted user should behave rather than taking myopic actions. This investigation provides us some 
insights to the following question: why should a strategic user sense its environment and learn the response 
strategies of its competitors and consequently, what is the benefit that a foresighted user can achieve compared 
with the myopic case?  
To illustrate the foresighted behavior, Fig. 2 shows a simple Stackelberg game [11]. Note that in this game, 
the row player has a strictly dominant strategy [12], Down. Therefore, two players will end up with a (Down, 
Left) play if the row player is myopic. However, if the row player is aware of the column player’s coupled 
reaction, they will end up with a (Up, Right) play, which leads to an increased payoff for both players. It is worth 
noticing that additional information is needed to attain this performance improvement. The row player needs to 
know the payoff and the response strategy of the column player. To formulate how a strategic user can take 
foresighted actions, we introduce the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium. The next subsection will define the 
Stackelberg equilibrium and show its existence in the power control game. 
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B. Stackelberg Equilibrium 
Let { }, ,k kU⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦G K A  represent a game where { }1, ,K= "K  is the set of players, kA  is the set of actions 
available to user k , and kU  is the user k ’s payoff [12]. In the power control game, user k ’s payoff kU  is the its 
achievable data rate kR  and its action set kA  is the set of transmit PSDs satisfying constraint (1). Recall that the 
Nash equilibrium is defined to be any ( )* *1 , , Ka a"  satisfying 
( ) ( )* * *, , 1, ,k k k k k k k kU a a U a a for all a and k K− −≥ ∈ = "A ,                                    (4) 
where ( )* * * * *1 1 1, , , , ,k k k Ka a a a a− − += " "  [12].  
We also define the action *ka  to be a best response (BR) to actions ka−  if  
( ) ( )*, , ,k k k k k k k kU a a U a a a− −≥ ∀ ∈ A .                                                      (5) 
The set of user k ’s best response to ka−  is denoted as ( )k kBR a− . 
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept originally defined for the cases where a hierarchy of 
actions exists between users [12]. Only one player is the leader and the other ones are followers. The leader 
begins the game by announcing its action. Then, the followers react to the leader’s action. The Stackelberg 
equilibrium prescribes an optimal strategy for the leader if its followers always react by playing their Nash 
equilibrium strategies in the smaller sub-game. For example, in a two player game, where user 1 is the leader and 
user 2 is the follower, an action *1a  is the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for user 1 if  
( )( ) ( )( )* *1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1, , ,U a BR a U a BR a a≥ ∀ ∈ A .                                             (6) 
For example, in Fig. 2, Up is the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the row player.  
Next, we define Stackelberg equilibrium in the general case. Let ( )kNE a  be the Nash equilibrium strategy of 
the remaining players if player k  chooses to play ka , i.e. ( ) ( ), , ,k k i i i i iNE a a a BR a a i k− −= ∀ = ∈ ≠A . The 
strategy profile ( )( )* *,k ka NE a  is a Stackelberg equilibrium with user k  leading iff 
( )( ) ( )( )* *, , ,k k k k k k k kU a NE a U a NE a a≥ ∀ ∈ A .                                            (7) 
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If multiple Nash equilibria exist in the followers’ sub-game, the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium 
becomes more complicated. Interested readers can refer to [10][14] for more details. This paper does not 
consider this case and focus on the channels where a unique Nash equilibrium exists in the sub-game [13]. In 
particular, the considered channel conditions are specified as follows: 
Considered Channels : Define 2 2f f fij ij jjH Hα = . For each frequency bin, we consider a K K×  channel 
gain matrix ( )1, ,f f NΑ = " , where [ ]f fij ijαΑ =  for i j≠  and [ ] 0f iiΑ = . This paper considers diagonally 
dominant channels in which 
2
1fΑ <  for any { }1, ,f N∈ " . It is shown that a unique Nash equilibrium for the 
power control game exists in these channels and it can be achieved using the IW algorithm [13]. 
In fact, the requirement of hierarchic actions in the original definition of Stackelberg equilibrium can be 
removed in our problem if we consider the repeated interaction among all the users. Regardless of the initial 
action order, the foresighted user can always perform the Stackelberg strategy. As long as it changes its transmit 
PSD, the other myopic users will water-fill with respect to their updated noise-plus-interference PSDs to gain an 
immediate increase in transmission rates until the system converges to an equilibrium. We are interested in the 
performance achieved at the steady state. Therefore, the initial action order between the foresighted user and the 
myopic users does not influence the final outcome of this game. Note that initially we assume that a single 
foresighted user exists in this game. How the users should decide to play foresightedly or myopically and the 
extension to the cases where there are multiple foresighted users will be discussed in Section IV. The following 
theorem establishes the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium in the considered power control game. 
Theorem 1: Under the considered channel conditions, the Stackelberg equilibrium always exists in the 
multi-user power control game. 
Proof : Suppose user 1 is the only foresighted user in this game. First, user 1’s maximal achievable rate in an 
interference-free environment is 
( )2max *1 2 1 11 11 log 1N f f ffR P H σ== +∑ ,                                                     (8) 
where ( )2*1 1 11f f fP Hλ σ += −  is the water-filling solution, ( ) ( )max 0,x x+ = , and λ  is a constant satisfying the 
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constraint in (1) with equality. 
Second, it has been shown that in the considered channels, the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium 
are always guaranteed [13]. In the interference channel consisting of the 1K −  followers, whatever form of 
11
fP ∈ A  user 1 chooses, they will regard user 1’s transmit PSD as part of the fixed background noise PSD, i.e. 
2
1 1 , 1
f f f f
j j jH P jσ σ= + ≠ . Since the channel gains in the followers’ sub-game still satisfy the sufficient 
condition in [13], the convergence to a unique Nash equilibrium always holds, i.e. a single ( )1NE a  exists for 
1 1a∀ ∈ A . 
To summarize, since 1R  is bounded, and for 1 1a∀ ∈ A , the remaining players’ action will always lead to a 
Nash equilibrium, we have 
( )( ) max1 1 1 1 1 10 , ,U a NE a R a≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ A .                                                (9) 
Therefore, there exist *1 1a ∈ A  such that ( )( ) ( )( ){ }
1 1
* *
1 1 1 1 1 1, sup ,
a
U a NE a U a NE a
∈
=
A
. We can conclude that 
Stackelberg equilibrium always exists for this power control game. ■ 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
In this section, we study how to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium in the two-user case, and formulate the 
foresighted behavior as a bi-level programming problem. We analyze the computational complexity of the 
optimal solution, and show that the optimum is computationally intractable for the bi-level program. We start 
from the simplest two-user version, because it is illustrative for understanding the interactions emerging among 
competing users. The extension to the multi-user case will be discussed in Section IV. 
A. A Bi-level Programming Formulation 
The Stackelberg equilibrium applied to the two-user power control game can be represented by a bi-level 
mathematical problem [14], in which the foresighted user acts as the leader and the other user behaves as the 
follower. The leader chooses a transmit PSD to maximize its own benefits by considering the response of its 
follower, who reacts to the leader’s transmit PSD by water-filling over the entire frequency band. Hence, the 
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Stackelberg equilibrium can be found by solving the following optimization problem: 
1
2
1
2
1 1 2 2
1 11
2
2 2
1 2 1 1
2 21
max log 1 ( )
. . , 0, ( )
argmax log 1 ( )
. . 0,
fN
f f f
f
N f f
f
fN
f f f
f
Nf f
f
P
aupper level
N P
problem
s t P P b
P
clower level
N P
problem
s t P P
α
α
=
=
′ =
=
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎜ +− ⎟⎜⎪ ⎟⎜⎪ +⎝ ⎠⎨⎪⎪⎪ ≤ ≥⎪⎪⎩
⎛ ⎞′ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= +− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
′ ′≥ ≤
∑
∑
∑
∑
max
1
ma
2
P
P
P
P
P . ( )d
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x
                                (10) 
where 
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 11 1 12 22 2 2 22 2 21 11, , ,
f f f f f f f f f f f fN H H H N H H Hσ α σ α= = = = . The sub-problem in (10.a)- 
(10.b) is called the upper-level problem and (10.c)-(10.d) corresponds to the lower-level problem. Recall that 
additional information is indispensable to formulate this bi-level program. This information includes the other 
user’s channel condition 2
fN  and 2
fα , maximum power constraint max2P , and its response strategy, i.e. the IW 
algorithm. By letting 1P  and 2P  to be the transmit PSDs of the IW algorithm 1NEP  and 2NEP , we can see that 
the Nash equilibrium actually gives a lower bound of the problem in (10). Furthermore, by including the 
opponent’s reaction into the lower-level problem, the user can avoid the myopic IW approach and potentially 
improve its performance. In addition, as we will show later, user 1’s foresightedness turns out to even improve 
the myopic user’s performance. Now we make several illustrative remarks by showing two simple examples.  
Remark 1: The Nash equilibrium achieved by the IW algorithm may not solve the bi-level program (10). In 
other words, there exist other feasible power allocation schemes that can attain strictly better performance than 
that of the Nash equilibrium. 
Example 1: We consider a two-user system with the parameters 2,N =  1 21 2 4,N N= =  2 11 2 1,N N= =  
0.5fiα =  for ,i f∀ , 10= =max max1 2P P . In this simple two-channel scenario, it is easy to derive that 1R =  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 12 1 1 2 1 1log 1 8.5 0.25 log 1 10 1.5 0.25P P P P⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + + − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  bits. Because 
1
1
1
0R
P
∂ <∂ , 1R  is maximized when 
1
1 0P = . The achievable rates attained at the Stackelberg equilibrium is 1 2.939SER ≈  bits and 2 3.474SER ≈  bits. 
The unique Nash equilibrium is reached by { }1 2, 8NE =P  and { }2 8,2NE =P  and its achievable rates are 1NER =  
2 2.645
NER ≈  bits. 
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Remark 2: For some channel realizations, the Nash strategy solves the problem (10). If 0fiα =  for ,i f∀ , the 
upper-level and lower-level problems in bi-level program (10) are reduced to two uncoupled problems and the 
single user water-filling solution can achieve the upper bound in (8). In addition, we give a non-trivial example 
in which 0fiα ≠  for ,i f∀  and the Nash strategy still solves the problem in (10). 
Example 2: Set the parameters 1 21 2,N N  in Example 1 to be 6, and keep the remaining ones unchanged. We 
have ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 2 1 1 2 1 1log 1 11 0.25 log 1 10 1 0.25R P P P P⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − + + − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  bits. In this channel realization, the 
Nash equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium. Both equilibria are reached at { }1 0,10=P  and 
{ }2 10,0=P  and the resulting rates are 1 2 3.460R R= ≈  bits. 
Remark 3: As opposed to the narrow-band case [15], we would like to highlight that the degrees of freedom 
in allocating the power across multiple bands is essential for the foresighted user to improve its performance. 
Consider the single-band case in which 1N = . Note that user i ’s achievable rate iR  is monotonically 
increasing in its transmitted power iP . If users selfishly maximize their achievable rates, all of them will 
transmit at their maximum power in the single band, which results in the unique Nash equilibrium. It is easy to 
check that it is also the unique Stackelberg equilibrium and it is also Pareto efficient. 
Although these examples provide us some intuition about the relationship between NE and SE, we are still 
interested in computing the Stackelberg equilibrium in general scenarios. The following subsection will 
reformulate the bi-level program into a single-level problem, which helps us to understand the computational 
complexity of the Stackelberg equilibrium in the multi-user power control games. 
B. An Exact Single-level Reformulation 
Bi-level programming problems belong to the mathematical programs having optimization problems as 
constraints. It is well-known they are intrinsically difficult to solve [14]. To understand the computational 
complexity, we first transform the original bi-level program into a single-level reformulation with the form of 
( )1
1
2
1 2 11 1 2 2
1 11
max log 1
, , ,
. . , 0.
fN
f f f
f
N f f
f
P
N g
s t P P
α=
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
≤ ≥
∑
∑
max
2
max
1
P P N P
P
α                                            (11) 
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in which ( )1 2 12 , , ,fg max2PP N α  is a function that determines user 2’s allocated power in the fth channel, 
{ }1 22 2 2 2, , , NN N N= "N , and { }1 21 1 1 1, , , Nα α α= "α .  
Note that the lower-level problem in (10) is a standard convex programming problem. Its optimum is given 
by ( ) ( )1 2 1 22 2 2 1 1, , ,f f f f fP g K N Pα
+
= = − −max2PP N α ,  where 2K  is a constant that satisfies 21
N f
f
P
=
=∑ max2P . In 
practice, 2K  is usually obtained using numerical (e.g. bisection) methods. In fact, an explicit expression of 
( )1 2 12 , , ,fg max2PP N α  is needed to analytically handle single-level formulation. Towards this end, we first define 
a permutation { } { }: 1,2, , 1,2, ,N Nπ →" " , which ranks all the channels based on their noise plus interference 
PSDs and satisfies 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 2 2 21 2 2 1 1 2 1 1, .f f f f f ff f if N P N Pπ π α α< + < +                                              (12) 
Then, we can extend the results in [16], and have the following closed-form expression: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
2 1 1 2 1 1
11 2 12
1 , ,
, , ,
0, ,
k
m m m f f f
f
m
N P N P f k
kg
f k
π π πα α π
π
− − −
=
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟+ + − − ≤⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎪ ⎟⎜= ⎝ ⎠⎨⎪⎪⎪ >⎪⎪⎩
∑max2max
2P N α
P
P            (13) 
where k  can be found according to the condition: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 12 1 1
1
1
1 1 1
2 1 12 1 1
1
1 .
k
k k k m m m
m
k
k k k m m m
m
k N P N P
k N P N P
π π π π π π
π π π π π π
α α
α α
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
=
+
+ + +
=
+ − + < ≤
+ + − +
∑
∑
max
2P
                           (14) 
We can see that function ( )1 2 12 , , ,fg max2PP N α  ranks all the frequency channels based on the channel conditions 
and gradually increases the water-level until the maximal power constraint is satisfied. 
Even though we have the closed-form expression of ( )1 2 12 , , ,fg max2PP N α , the single-level problem (11) is 
still intractable due to its non-convexity. Generally speaking, the global optimum can only be found via an 
exhaustive search. If we define the granularity in the foresighted user’s transmit power as PΔ , then the value of 
1
fP  can be limited to the set { }0, , ,PΔ max1P" . By searching all the possible combinations, the optimum can be 
found. Hence, such an exhaustive search in ( )11 1, , NP P"  has a overall complexity of (( ) )NPΔmax1PO . 
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Recently, Lagrangian duality theory has been successfully used to solve non-convex weighted sum-rate 
maximization in interference channel with moderate computational complexity [4]-[6]. We notice that the 
problem in (11) are similar with the problems investigated in these works in that the optimization variables 1P  
also appear in the denominators of the objective function. The following sections will revisit these dual 
approaches and show that these methods cannot reduce the computational complexity of problem (11), thereby 
demonstrating the challenges involved in optimally computing the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
C. Lagrangian Dual Approach for Non-convex Problems 
We continue studying the simple two-user scenario to introduce the dual method. In a two-user frequency- 
selective interference channel, the weighted sum-rate maximization investigated in [4]-[6] is given by 
( )
1 2
1 2
2 2
, 1 11 2 2 2 1 1
1 1 2 21 1
max log 1 1 log 1
. . , 0, , 0,
f fN N
f f f f f f
f f
N Nf f f f
f f
P P
N P N P
s t P P P P
ω ωα α= =
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜+ + − +⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
≤ ≥ ≤ ≥
∑ ∑
∑ ∑max max1 2
P P
P P
                                 (15) 
in which [ ]0,1ω ∈  is a fixed weight. The dual method forms the following Lagrangian 
( ) ( )1 21 2 1 2 2 2 1 21 2
1 1 2 2 2 1 1
, , , log 1 1 log 1 ,
f fN
f f
f f f f f f
f
P P
L P P
N P N P
λ λ ω ω λ λα α=
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎟ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜= + + − + − −⎨ ⎬⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑P P      (16) 
where 1 2, 0λ λ ≥  are Lagrangian dual variables. The Lagrangian dual function is defined as 
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
,
, max , , ,D Lλ λ λ λ=
0;P P
P P .                                                     (17) 
Denote the objective function of problem (15) as ( )1 2,f P P  and the overall complexity of exhaustive search is 
(( ( )) )NPi Δ∏ maxiPO . From optimization theory [17], we know that, for arbitrary feasible 1 2,P P , we have 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2, ,f D λ λ≤P P . This leads to ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
, ,
min , max ,D f
λ λ
λ λ ≥
P P
P P , and ( )
1 2
1 2
,
min ,D
λ λ
λ λ  provides an upper bound 
of the optimal value of the problem in (15). Generally speaking, if ( )1 2,f P P  is non-convex, the duality gap 
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
, ,
min , max ,D f
λ λ
λ λ −
P P
P P  is not zero. 
Fig. 3 summarizes the three key steps of a dual method, the OSB algorithm [4][5], that can efficiently find the 
global optimum of the problem in (15). First, for fixed 1 2,λ λ , the maximization of  ( )1 2 1 2, , ,L λ λP P  over 1 2,P P  
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in (17) is decomposed into N  uncoupled sub-problems, and each of them corresponds to a per-bin optimization. 
Therefore, the overall complexity of maximizing ( )1 2 1 2, , ,L λ λP P  is only ( ( ))PiN Δ∏ maxiPO . Second, it is 
shown that, for fixed k , the sum power of user k ’s optimal power allocation in a multicarrier system is a 
monotonic function of kλ  (Lemma 1, in [4]). This property guarantees that the bi-section dual update over 1 2,λ λ  
will converge to the dual optimum. Third, it is also proven that, if the number of frequency bins N  is large 
enough and fijH  and fkσ  are smooth in the spectral domain, the optimization problem (15) satisfies the so-called 
“time-sharing property” (Theorem 1 and 2, in [5]), and the duality gap of this non-convex problem is zero. 
Combining the three properties together, the dual approach can find the global optimum with the computational 
complexity of 1( ( ))PiT N Δ∏ maxiPO , where 1T  is the number of iterations needed for dual-update. We can see 
that the complexity of the dual approach is greatly reduced compared with that of the exhaustive search in the 
primal domain. In addition, it is found in [5] that, if ( )1 2,D λ λ  is approximated using a local maximum of 
( )1 2 1 2, , ,L λ λP P , the ISB algorithm can achieve near-optimal performance with the computational complexity 
of 1 2( ( ))PiTT N Δ∑ maxiPO , where 2T  is the number of iterations required for evaluating the local maximum. 
D. The Lagrangian Dual Approach for Computing Stackelberg Equilibrium 
Now we apply the dual approach for our problem in (11) to understand why the Stackelberg equilibrium in 
our considered problem is intrinsically difficult to compute. Fig. 4 summarizes the key properties of the dual 
approach that will be addressed in the following parts. Denote the objective function of problem (11) as ( )1f ′ P . 
Consider its dual objective function ( )D μ′  for a fixed Lagrangian dual variable μ : 
( ) ( )
1
1max ,D Lμ μ′ ′= 0;P P                                                               (18) 
in which ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 2 11
1 2 11 1 2 2
, log 1
, , ,
fN N f
f f f f
f
P
L P
N g
μ μα ==
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜′ = + + −⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
max
1max
2
P
P N
P
Pα . For a given μ , denote 
the optimal power allocation that maximizes (18) as ( ) ( )
1
1 1argmax ,Lμ μ′= 0;PP P  and ( ) ( )11
f
f
μ μ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦P P , The 
following lemma holds for ( )1 μP : 
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Lemma 1: ( )11
N f
f
μ=∑ P  is monotonic decreasing in μ . In addition, we have ( )11lim 0N ffμ μ=→∞ =∑ P  and 
( )11 0
N f
f=
= +∞∑ P . 
Proof : It is easy to see that ( )11 0
N f
f= = +∞∑ P . The rest of the proof is the same as in Lemma 1 in [4].■ 
Fig. 5 gives a graphical illustration of the above Lemma. Consider a sequence of optimization problems 
similar with (11). These problems are parameterized by the constraint imposed over user 1’s maximal sum 
power. The solid curve in Fig. 5 is a plot of the optimal value ( )( )111 ,N ff P f∗ ∗= ′∑ P  as this constraint varies. The 
curve is plotted with 11
N f
f
P∗=∑  on the x-axis. The y-axis is located at the point where 11N ff P∗= =∑ max1P . The 
intersection of the curve with the y-axis is the optimum of (11), i.e. ( )
1
1max f ′P P . For a fixed μ , by drawing a 
tangent line to the ( )( )111 ,N ff P f∗ ∗= ′∑ P  curve and measuring the intersection of this tangent line with the y-axis, 
the value of ( )D μ′  can be graphically obtained. According to Lemma 1, as μ  increases, the x-axis value of the 
tangent point monotonically increases. We denote ( )argminD
μ
μ μ∗ ′= . Recall that Lemma 1 does not claim the 
continuity of ( )11
N f
f
μ=∑ P  in μ . It is because the allocated powers in different frequency bins are coupled due 
to function ( )1 2 12 , , ,fg max2PP N α  and the time-sharing property in [5] is not guaranteed for problem (11). The 
discontinuity may lead to nonzero duality gap, i.e. at least two tangent points exist on the tangent line in Fig. 5 
and they correspond to different power constraints x1P  and y1P . If the duality gap is positive, the following 
theorem indicates that ( )D μ∗′  provides a tighter upper bound of the achievable rate than max1R  in (8). 
Theorem 2: If the duality gap is nonzero, i.e. ( ) ( )
1
1maxD fμ∗′ ′> P P , the dual optimum provides a tighter 
upper bound of user 1’s maximal achievable rate than the bound in (8), i.e. ( ) max1D Rμ∗′ < . 
Proof : As shown in Fig. 5, the non-zero duality gap implies that there exist at least two possible values for 
( )11
N f
f
μ∗=∑ P , which are denoted as x1P  and y1P  and they satisfy < <x max y1 1 1P P P . Denote the optimal power 
allocation of having power constraints x1P  and y1P  as 1−P  and 1+P  respectively. We have that 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 11 1 .N Nf ff fD f P f Pμ μ μ∗ − ∗ − + ∗ += =′ ′ ′= + − = + −∑ ∑max max1 1P PP P              (19) 
Moreover, since < <x max y1 1 1P P P , there exists 0 1υ< <  such that ( )1υ υ= + −max x y1 1 1P P P . Immediately, we get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11D f fμ υ υ∗ − +′ ′ ′= + −P P . It corresponds to the time-sharing scenario, in which the power allocation 
1
−P  is adopted for time-fraction υ  and 1+P  for time-fraction 1 υ− . Consider the problem of allocating user 1’s 
power subject to the maximal power constraint max1P  in the interference-free environment. We know that the 
optimal solution is the single-user water-filling. Noting that ( )1υ υ= + −max x y1 1 1P P P  and ≠x y1 1P P , the 
aforementioned time-sharing strategy is sub-optimal for this problem. Therefore, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 2 1 11 1
1
2 2* max
2 2 11 11 1 1 11 1
1 1
1 log 1
1 log 1 log 1 ,
N
f f f
f
N N
f f f f f f
f f
D f f P H
P H P H R
μ υ υ υ σ
υ σ σ
∗ − + −
=
+
= =
′ ′ ′= + − ≤ +
+ − + < + =
∑
∑ ∑
P P
                       (20) 
and this concludes the proof. ■ 
By Theorem 2, evaluating the dual function leads to a tighter upper bound of Stackelberg equilibrium than 
max
1R . However, it is unfortunate that the computational complexity of optimally maximizing ( )1 ,L μ′ P  is still 
(( ) )NPΔmax1PO . This is because term ( )1 2 12 , , ,fg max2PP N α  in the denominator term of (11) is also a function of 
the allocated power ( )1fP f f′ ′ ≠ , which makes it impossible to decouple the maximization in (18) into N  
independent sub-problems. To conclude, the complexity of optimal solution in the dual domain is the same as 
the primal approach, which again highlights the fact that the Stackelberg equilibrium is difficult to compute. 
IV. LOW-COMPLEXITY ALGORITHM, SIMULATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS 
In this section, we propose a low-complexity dual algorithm to search the Stackelberg equilibrium and 
examine its achievable performance via extensive numerical simulations. We also discuss how the strategic 
users can obtain the required information and the extensions to general multi-user scenarios. 
A. A Low-Complexity Dual Approach 
As we have shown, the dual approach cannot reduce the complexity of the global optimum of problem (11). 
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However, inspired by the ISB algorithm [5], we develop an efficient dual approach, which is listed as Algorithm 
1. The basic idea of the algorithm is to approximately evaluate ( )D μ′  by locally optimizing ( )1 ,L μ′ P . For 
fixed μ , the algorithm finds the optimal 1fP  while keeping 1 1 11 11 1, , , , ,f f NP P P P− +" "   fixed, and changes the 
index f  until it converges to a local maximum for ( )1 ,L μ′ P . Then the algorithm updates μ  using bi-section 
search and repeats the procedure above until the convergence is achieved.  
As discussed in [5], the local optimum depends on the initial starting point and the ordering of iterations. 
Moreover, the proof of convergence of the whole algorithm becomes an issue. Algorithm 1 sets the Nash 
equilibrium as the initial starting point. In most of the experimental setting we have tested, Algorithm 1 has been 
observed to converge to a feasible solution within 10-15 iterations. The computational complexity of this 
iterative algorithm is only 1 2( )PTT N Δmax1PO  and it reduces the complexity of the optimal exhaustive search by 
a factor of 1 2(( ) ( ))NP T N−Δmax1PO , which is considerably large for small PΔ  and large N . Table I 
summarizes the computational complexity comparison for user 1 if it adopts different algorithms, in which 3T  is 
the number of iterations required in the iterative water-filling algorithm. 
B. Illustrative Results 
In this sub-section, we evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1 by comparing with the IW algorithm. We 
simulate a wireless system with 20 sub-carriers over the 6.25-MHz band. We assume that = =max max1 2P P  200  
and 1 2 0.01
f fσ σ= = . To evaluate the performance, we tested 510  sets of frequency-selective fading channels 
where a unique Nash equilibrium exists, which are simulated using a four-ray Rayleigh model with the 
exponential power profile and 160 ns delay between two adjacent rays [18]. The simulated power of each ray 
decreases exponentially according to its delay. The total power of all rays of 11
fH  and 22
fH  is normalized as one, 
and that of 12
fH  and 21
fH  is normalized as 0.5 . 
Fig. 6 and 7 show the power allocations for both users using different algorithms. In the IW algorithm, each 
user water-fills the whole frequency band by regarding its competitor’s transmit PSD as background noise until 
the Nash equilibrium is achieved. In contrast, user 1 does not water-fill if it adopts Algorithm 1. For example, in 
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Fig. 6, user 1 allocates a large amount of power in frequency bin 3 even though it can gain an immediate increase 
in 1R  by re-allocating some of its power in the frequency bins 5 and 6 where the noise plus interference PSD is 
below its water-levels in the frequency bins 7-12. 
Denote user i ’s achieved rate by deploying Algorithm 1 as iR′ . Fig. 8 shows the simulated cumulative 
distribution functions (cdf) of / NEi iR R′ . From the curve, Algorithm 1 achieves a higher rate for the foresighted 
user in all the simulated realizations. The average rate improvement that Algorithm 1 provides over the IW 
algorithm is 38%. In addition, it is surprising to find that, in 95% of the simulation settings, Algorithm 1 also 
results in a higher rate 2R′  than 2NER  for the myopic user, and the average rate improvement is 45%. This is 
because user 1’s Stackelberg strategy mitigates its interference caused to user 2. 
We also simulate the scenarios in which the total power of 12
fH  and 21
fH  is normalized as 0.25 and all the 
other parameters remain the same as above. Fig. 9 shows the simulated cdfs of / NEi iR R′ . The average rate 
improvement for user 1 is 27% and that of user 2 is 32%. It is intuitive that the average rate improvement is 
decreasing when the power of 12
fH  and 21
fH  decreases, because the interference coupling between users and the 
foresighted user’s ability in shaping the myopic user’s response are both reduced. 
C. Information Acquisition 
Previous sections mentioned that, in order to play the Stackelberg equilibrium, the additional information 
about the competing user’s CSI, maximum power constraint, and power allocation strategy is indispensable. In 
practice, there are several possible methods to acquire this required information. 
First, the myopic user has the incentive to provide the required information, because its performance can be 
greatly improved if the foresighted player knows the myopic player’s private information. In the distributed 
setting, users can individually decide whether or not to play the Stackelberg strategy based on their 
computational hardware constraints. The user that wants to behave myopically can reveal its information to the 
foresighted user. This can be viewed as the user’s cooperative behavior to avoid mutual interference. 
When no information exchanges among users are possible, the alternative way for users to gather this 
information is through predictive modeling. If the foresighted user strategically changes its power allocation, it 
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can measure and model the resulting interference PSD, i.e. estimate the functional expression of 
( )1 2 12 , , ,fg max2PP N α , without any information exchange among users. For instance, in [19], we showed that the 
foresighted user can effectively model its experienced interference as a linear function of its own allocated 
power, formulate a local approximation of the original bi-level program, and substantially improve both users’ 
achievable rates. 
D. Extensions to Multi-user Games 
The two-user formulation can be extended to the general cases in which multiple users can be myopic or 
foresighted. The analysis in these cases becomes much more involved. We denote the number of foresighted 
user as fn  and the number of myopic user as mn . We briefly address two remaining cases as follows. 
In the first case, 1, 1f mn n= > . As in (11), we can still have the following single-level formulation: 
( )1
1
2 1
1 1 11 12
1 11
max log 1
, , , , ,
. . , 0,
m
m
fN
nf f f
f nk kk
N f f
f
P
N q
s t P P
α+= +=
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
≤ ≥
∑ ∑
∑
max max
max
1
"P P N 2P P
P
α                                  (21) 
in which { } {2 , : 2, , 1, 1, , , : 1, , 1, 2, , 1,f f f f fm m mi i ii i ijN H N i n f K i n j nσ α= = = + = = = + = +" " " "N α  
}1, ,f K= " , and ( )1 1, , , , , mf nkq +max max"P N α 2P P  is the function determining user k’s allocated power in channel f. 
As a general from of the two-user case, problem (21) is also non-convex. It is easy to verify that Lemma 1 and 
Theorem 2 still hold. Although it is difficult to analytically derive ( )1 1, , , , , mf nkq +max max"P N α 2P P , we are still able 
to numerically evaluate it. Hence, Algorithm 1 can be applied in this case by replacing its lines 7 to 8 with 
numerically finding local maxima of 
( )
1
2 11
1
1 11 1
2
log 1
, , , , ,
m
m
N f
f
n
f f f f
nk k
k
P
P
N q
μ
α
+
=
+
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ + − ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟+ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑
∑ max max"P N 2P Pα
. We 
simulate the three-user scenarios in which 
2
1
0.25 for , 200,N fijf H i j= = ≠ =∑ maxiP  and 0.01fiσ = , and all the 
other parameters remain the same as Section IV.B. Fig. 10 shows the simulated cdfs of / NEi iR R′ . The average 
rate improvement for user 1 is 34% and that of user 2 and 3 is 10.5%. From Fig. 10, we can see that, the 
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Stackelberg strategy also benefits the two myopic users in more than 83% of the channel realizations. 
Assume now that we have multiple foresighted users, i.e. 1, 1f mn n> ≥ . In this case, the single objective 
function in the original upper-level problem disappears and it becomes a multi-objective optimization problem. 
Using similar arguments in Theorem 1, we can show that the Nash equilibrium still exists in the followers’ game. 
For these foresighted users, a reasonable outcome is to choose an operating point in the set fn =R  
( ){ }1, , : , 1, ,f NEn i i fR R R R for all i n≥ =" " , where NEiR  is user i ’s achievable rate if all the users are myopic. 
This point can be determined based on the negotiation among the foresighted users. Cooperative game theory 
provides many solution concepts, e.g. bargaining, for choosing the operating point [12]. Note that the overall 
game in this scenario is a mixture of cooperation and competition in that the cooperation exists among the 
foresighted users while myopic players compete with each other. A possible way of achieving the boundary 
point on fnR  is to let some coordinator solve the following weighted sum-rate maximization and determine the 
transmitted PSDs for different foresighted users: 
( )1 2, , 1 1 11
1
max log 1
, , , , , , ,
. . , 0, , 1, , ,
f m
nf
f f f mf
fN
i
i n nf f f
f n n n ni ki kk n
N f f NE
i i fi if
P
N q
s t P P R R i n
ω
α+= + += +
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
≤ ≥ ≥ =
∑ ∑
∑
max max
max
i
" " "
"
P P P P N P P
P
α              (22) 
in which 0iω ≥  is user i ’s weight. Although this problem is generally difficult to solve optimally, some 
low-complexity methods similar to Algorithm 1 can be adopted to obtain sub-optimal solutions. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper considers the strategic behavior in determining the transmit power PSD for selfish users sharing a 
frequency-selective interference channel. We adopt the game theoretic concept of Stackelberg equilibrium and 
model the two-user case as a bi-level programming problem. We show that the Stackelberg equilibrium is 
intrinsically difficult to compute and propose a low-complexity approach based on Lagrangian dual theory. 
Numerical results show the strategic user should avoid shortsighted Nash strategy and it can substantially 
improve both users’ performance if it knows the CSI and response strategy of the competing user. Operational 
methods for acquiring the necessary information and extensions to multi-user scenarios are proposed. Obtaining 
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satisfactory performance with minimal information exchange while multiple foresighted users exist is 
indentified as a problem for further investigation. 
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Fig. 1. Gaussian interference channel model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Left Right 
Up 1, 0 3, 2 
 Down 2, 1 4, 0 
 
Fig. 2. Stackelberg game: the row player’s payoff is given first in each cell, 
with the column player’s payoff following. 
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Fig. 3. Key steps of the dual approach of non-convex weighted sum-rate maximization. 
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Fig. 4.  Complexity and properties of the dual approach of computing the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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Fig. 5. Duality gap for the problem in (11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 1:  A low-complexity dual approach 
1:     input: 1 2 1 2, , , , ,f f f fN N for fα α ∀max max1 2P P  
2:     initialization : max min1 1 , ,NE μ μ=P P  
3:     repeat 
4:         ( )max min /2.μ μ μ= +  
5:              repeat 
6:                  for 1f =  to N , 
7:                      set ( )( ){ }1 1 2 11 1 1 2 2 11argmax ln 1 , , ,f Nf f f f f fP fP P N g Pα μ= ⎡ ⎤= + + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ max2P N α P  
8:                     by keeping 1 1 11 11 1, , , , ,
f f NP P P P− +" "  fixed. 
9:                  end 
10:            until ( )11 1, , NP P"  converges 
11:        if  11
N f
f
P= >∑ max1P , ( )min max min /2μ μ μ= + ; else  ( )max max min /2μ μ μ= + . 
12:   until it converges 
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Algorithm Computational complexity 
Exhaustive search (( ) )NPΔmax1PO  
Algorithm 1 1 2( )PTT N Δmax1PO  
Iterative water-filling 3( )T NO  
Table I. User 1’s computational complexity for different algorithms. 
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Fig. 6. User 1’s power allocation using different algorithms. 
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Fig. 7. User 2’s power allocation using different algorithms. 
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Fig. 8. Cdfs for the ratio of / NEi iR R′  ( 2 212 21 0.5f ff fH H= =∑ ∑ ). 
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Fig. 9. Cdfs for the ratio of / NEi iR R′ ( 2 212 21 0.25f ff fH H= =∑ ∑ ). 
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Fig. 10. Cdfs for the ratio of / NEi iR R′ ( 2 0.25,fijf H i j= ≠∑ ). 
 
